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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
1 JMMY HILL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19275 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Timmy Hill, was charged with theft by 
deception, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann.<:; 76-6-405 (1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of theft by deception on April 28, 1983 in the second Judicial 
District Court for weber County, Utah, the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist presiding. On May 31, 1983, the trial court 
sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years. On July 19, 1983, the 
trial court ordered appellant's release fran the Utah State 
Prison pending disposition of this appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
On April 26, 1984, this Court reversed appellant's 
conviction, holding that he should have been charged with a 
violation of utah Code Ann.~ S8-37b-4 (Supp. 1983) (see State 
v. Hi 11 , Utah , P.2d , slip op. no. lq27'i, attacherl as 
Appendix Al. 
RELIP,F SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks an order granting a re=hear1 nq ur, 
alternatively, a modification of this court's opinion in Stat~ 
v. Hill, if a full rehearing is not deemed necessary. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent incorporates by reference the statement 
of facts set forth in its brief on appeal, filed November 2'i, 
19 8 3. 
INTRODUCTION 
The standard established by this Court for 
determining whether a petition for rehearing is proper was 
expressed in Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 4 Utah 2q4, 11 
P. 512 (1886): 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must 
be made. We must be convinced that the 
court failed to consider some material 
point in the case, or that it erred in its 
conclusions, or that some matter has been 
discovered which was unknown at the time 
of the hearing. 
11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). In Cummings v. Nielson, 42 
Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court stated: 
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To make an application for a rehearing is 
a matter of right, and we have no desire 
to discourage the practice of filing 
petitions for rehearings in proper cases • 
. • • [A] rehearing should not be applied 
for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some material fact or facts, or 
have overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or have either 
misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result .•.. If 
there are some reasons, however, such as 
we have indicated above, or other good 
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should 
be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
129 P. at fi24. The argument portion of this brief will show 
that, based on these standards, respondent's petition for 
rehearing is properly before this Court. 
P.2d 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. ~ 58-37b-4 (Supp. 1983): 
RATHER, APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED 
UNDER ~ 58-37-B(l)(a)(iv). 
The majority opinion in State v. Hill, Utah, 
, slip op. no. 19275 (decided April 26, 1984)(see 
Appendix A), concluded that because appellant's conduct was 
specifically covered by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (Supp. 
19R3), the section within Utah's IP'litation Controlled 
Substances Act found to be controlling in this case, 
appellant's conviction of theft by deception under Utah Code 
Ann. ~ 76-6-405 (1978) should be reversed. In short, 
-3-
the majority held that appellant should have been chargeo 
under§ 58-37b-4. This conclusion misconstrues the Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act and ignores the provision within 
Utah's Controlled substances Act which clearly applies to 
appellant's conduct. 
in Hill: 
As noted in Chief Justice Hall's dissenting opinion 
[T]he clear intention of the [Imitation 
Controlled substances] Act, [which is 
patterned closely after the Model 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act 
drafted by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), United States 
Department of Just ice], is to deal with 
manufacturers, distributors and users of 
drugs that are not claimed to be the real 
thing but that look like the real thing 
and have a like effect. Certainly, baking 
soda does not fit that category, nor is 
there any indication that the DEA intended 
to reach persons who were selling non-drug 
substances, such as baking soda, 
representing them as controlled 
substances, such as cocaine. Similarly, 
there is no indication that the Utah 
Legislature intended the Imitation 
Controlled substances Act to apply other 
than to the conduct discussed by the DEA. 
Slip op. at p.4, C.J. Hall, dissenting; see also Prefatory 
Note to the Model Act (attached as Appendix R). Given this, 
the majority's conclusion that appellant's sale of baking soda 
in lieu of cocaine violated§ 58-37b-4, is incorrect. Rather, 
appellant's conduct is covered by Utah Code Ann. ~ 58-37-8(1) 
(a}(iv) (Supp. 1983), which reads: 
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it 
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly 
ano intentionally: 
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(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value or to negotiate to 
have a controlled substance distributed or 
dispensed for value and distribute, 
dispense, or negotiate the distribution or 
di spe ns ing of any other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of the specific 
controlled substance so offered, agreed, 
consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
That section clearly applies to the situation present in this 
case, a "turkey buy" situation, where a controlled substance 
is offered for sale but at the time of the sale a substitute 
substance or "material in lieu of the specific controlled 
substance so offered" is delivered. See State v. Hicken, 
Utah, t;5g P.2d ln3R, 1039-1040 (19fl31. Therefore, appellant 
should have been charged with violating~ 58-37-B(l)(a)(iv), 
not ~ 5R-37b-4. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should grant 
respondent's petition for rehearing or, alternatively, modify 
its opinion, without a full rehearing, to indicate that 
appellant should have been charged under~ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv). 
Such a modification would satisfy the legitimate concerns 
about the majority's misapplication of the Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act expressed in the dissenting opinions 
of both Chief Justice Hall and Justice Oaks. Furthermore, 
this would make clear the intended distinction between conduct 
that violates E> 58-37-R(l)(a)(iv) and that which violates~ 
58-37b-4. Without that clarification, the majority opinion in 
Hill creates an unintended and unnecessary overlap of those 
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two sections, the violations of which carry different 
penalties, thus perpetuating the confusion which recently has 
plagued the enforcement of this state's drug laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah's Controlled Substances Act and its Imitation 
Controlled substances Act should be interpreted and applied in 
a manner consistent with the intent of the Legislature. When 
construing statutes, the fundamental question which transcends 
all others is what was the intent of the Legislature. Johnson 
v. Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 339, 411 P.2d 831, 832 
(1966). Insuring proper effect to that intent is a primary 
consideration. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., Utah, 609 P.2d 
934, 936 (1980). When the majority in Hill held that 
appellant's conduct was covered hy <> 5R-37b-4, it seemingly 
ignored the clear intent of the Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act and failed to consider the confusion its 
decision creates with respect to at least one provision within 
the Controlled Substances Act. Accordingly, this Court shoulr1 
grant rehearing so that it may hear argument on the question 
of which statute properly applies in this case--~ 5R-37b-4 or 
§ 58-37-B(l)(a)(iv). Alternatively, the Court should modify 
its opinion in Hill as specified in respondent's argument 
above, if it decides that a full rehearing is unnecessary. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /~y of May, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
~;6 tlu-0 0 ~~A_,_,.,~ _/ 
DAVE R. THOMPSO~ -~-!J---- ~ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----00000-----
State of Utah, No. 19275 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
F I L E D 
April 26, 1984 
Tl mny Hi 11, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
HOWE, Justice: 
Defendant Timmy Hill received $2,100 in cash from 
an undercover agent in exchange for one ounce of baking soda 
wrapµed in newspaper that the defendant claimed was "good" 
cocaine. He now appeals from a jury conviction of theft by 
deception, a second degree felony in violation of U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-6-405. 
Defendant contends that he was improperly charged 
under § 76-6-405 of our criminal code, which provides in per-
tinent part: 
(1) A person cor.11T1its theft if he obtains 
or exercises control over property of anoth-
er by deception and with a purpose to de-
prive hiM thereof. 
Instead, he claiMs he should have been charged under U.C.A., 
1953, § 58-37b-4, contained in the Imitation Controlled Sub-
stances Act that specifically proscribes the conduct with 
which he was charged. That section provides: 
Manufacture, distribution or posses-
sion of substance unlawful--Penalty. It 
is unlawful for any person to 1:1anufacture, 
distribute, or possess with intent to dis-
tribute, an imitation controlled substance. 
Any person who violates this section shall 
be guilty of a class B misdemeanor and 
upon conviction may be imprisoned for a 
term not exceeding six months, fined not 
more than $299, or both. [Emphasis added.] 
Section 58-37b-2(4) of the same act defines: 
(4) "Ioitation controlled substance'' means 
a substance that is not a controlled sub-
stance, which by overall dosage unit sub-
stantially resenbles a specific controlled 
substance in appearance (such as color, 
shape, size, and rnarkings), or by repre-
sentations made, would cause a reasonable 
person to believe that the substance is a 
controlled substance. 
We adhere to the principle that when an individual's 
conduct can be construed to be a violation of two overlapping 
statutes, the more specific statute gover~s. See Helrnuth v. 
Morris, Utah, 598 P.2d 333 (1979). See also State v. Shondel 
22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969), where we held that two ' 
statutes which interdicted the same conduct but irnposed dif-
ferent penalties entitled the violator to the lesser punish-
ment. 
In this case, the foregoing principle is buttressed 
by U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37-19, which provides in relevant part: 
[W]henever the requirements prescribed, 
the offenses defined or the penalties irn-
posed relating to substances controlled by 
this act shall be or appear to be in con-
flict with Title 58, Chapter 17 or any 
other laws of this state, the provisions 
of this act shall be controlling. 
In State v. Hicken, Utah, 659 P.2d 1038 (1983), we affirmed 
the dismissal of an information charging the defendant with 
aiding and abetting the distribution of a controlled substance 
for value because a specific provision of the controlled sub-
stance act, § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv), which prohibits the arranging 
of a sale of controlled substances, directly covered the de-
fendant's conduct and thus exclusively governed the offense. 
We cited Helrnuth v. Morris, Utah, supra, as controlling. 
The Imitation Controlled Substances Act, Chapter 37b, 
Title 58, was enacted in 1982, years after enactment of the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act, Chapter 37, Title 58. None-
theless, § 58-37-19 of the Controlled Substances Act is applicable 
to Chapter 37b offenses since the two acts are integrally con-
nected. For example, in its definition section, the Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act cites to the Controlled Substances 
Act for definition. The more recent act also provides an 
exemption for persons registered under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. Consequently, where specific conduct is proscribed 
by the Irnitation Controlled Substances Act, its provisions 
should control as mandated by § 58-37-19. 
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Section 58-37b-4 proscribes defendant's conduct. 
Unyuestionably the defendant made representations that would 
have caused a reasonable person to believe that the baking 
sodn was cocaine. The fact suggested by the State that in-
gested baking soda would not produce effects sinilar to co-
caine is unavailing. The baking soda sufficiently resembled 
cocaine so that combined with defendant's representations 
that it was "good" cocaine, it was an imitation controlled 
substance. (See U.C.A. § 58-37b-3 for considerations involved 
in deternining whether a substance is an imitation controlled 
substance where appearance alone nay be insufficient to es-
tablish that fact.) 
By exchanging the baking soda for money, the defend-
ant conmitted the distribution of an initation controlled 
substance. The definition of "distribute" under § 58-37b-2 
of the Imitation Controlled Substances Act is: 
Distribute means the actual, constructive, 
or attempted sale, transfer, delivery, or 
dispensing to another of an imitation con-
trolled substance. 
Were it not for the inclusion of "sale" in the def-
inition of distribute, the State's argument that the defend-
ant committed theft by deception of the $2,100 might be more 
persuasive. However, as the statutes are written, exchanging 
baking soda for money is distribution of an imitation con-
trolled substance in violation of § 58-37b-4. That provision 
covered defendant's conduct, and he should have been charged 
with its violation. 
Judgment reversed. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice Christine U. Durham, Justice 
HALL, Chief Justice: (Dissenting) 
I do not share the view of the Court that the decep-
tion engagld in by the defendant in violation of U.C.A.! 19~3, 
§ 76-6-405 also constitut2d a violation of the Utah Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act. 
1. That theft by deception is a legitimate charge, see, ~· 
Pritchard v. State, Alaska App., 673 P.2d 291 (1983); Common-
wealth v. Jones, Pa. Super., 393 A.2d 737 (1978). 
2. U.C.A., 1953, S 58-37b-1, et seq. 
-3- No. 19275 
The defendant unequivocally represented the bakin[ 
soda as being "good" cocaine. He nade no rei•resentation what-
soever that the baking soda wa~ an "imitation controlled sub-
stance" as defined by statute. Indeed, hakin~ soda has none 
of the properties of cocaine and only rescnbles it in general 
appearance. 
Utah's Initation Controlled Substances Act is pat-
terned closely after the ,.lodel Ird tation Control led Suhstancfc'• 
Act drafted by the Drug Enforcenent adninistration (DfA), -
United States5 Departnent of Justice. The Prefatory ~ote to the Model Act states the reasons it was felt necessary to 
draft legislation dealing with look-alike drugs. In sun, the 
clear thrust of the Act is to reach dealers who sell tablets, 
capsules, powders and liquids that "closely reser.1ble or even 
duplicate the appearance of well-known, brand nane controlled 
substances, but which contain only non-controlled over-the-
counter drugs such as caffeine, ephedrine, phenylpropano~anine, 
acetaninophen, or some conbination of these substances." 
These look-alikes are being advertised and widely circulated, 
particularly anong_the 7chool age population as "the 'safe' 
legal way to get high." This contributes to the growing dru~ 
problems in our schools by fostering acceptability of drug 
ingestion, which, in turn, often leads to experimentation with 
controlled drugs or to tragic accidents when the real thing is 
ingested by nistake. 
Thus, the clear intention of the Act is to deal with 
manufacturers, distributors and users of drugs that are not 
claimed to be the real thing but that look like the real thing 
and have a like effect. Certainly, baking soda does not fit 
that category, nor is there any indication that the DEA in-
tended to reach persons who were selling non-drug substances, 
such as baking soda, representing then as controlled substances, 
such as cocaine. Sinilarly, there is no indication that the 
Utah Legislature intended the Ini tation Controlled Substances 
Act to apply other than to the conduct discussed by the DEA. 
I view the Initation Controlled Substances Act as not 
having any application to defendant's conduct, and I would 
therefore affirm his conviction of theft by deception. 
3. U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37b-2(4). 
4. A nunber of other states have adopted so~e for~ of the 
Model Act. See, ~· Alaska Stat. § 11.73.010, et seq. (Supp. 
1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3451-1 (Supp. 1983); Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 18-5-601 (Supp. 1983). However, to date no 
court has interpreted the progeny of the Model Act and only 
one court has nentioned it in passing. Mccrary v. State, 
Ala. Cr. App., 429 So. 2d 1121 (1982). 
5. October, 1981, p.2a. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
No. 19275 -4-
Oaks, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of 
Chief Justice Hall. 
OAKS, Justice: (Dissenting) 
Representing baking soda as cocaine, defendant sold 
an ounce to an undercover agent for $2,100. The majority now 
reverses his conviction of the second degree felony of theft 
Ly deception, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-405, on the basis that he 
should have been charged with a violation of the Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act, § 58-37b-4, a Class B misdemeanor. 
The apparent holding that a Criminal Code conviction will be 
reversed when the defendant could have been charged under any 
of the statutes regulating drugs is a principle that can work 
untold mischief in the administration of the criminal law. 
That principle should not be adopted without the clearest 
direction from the Legislat~re or the prior decisions of this 
Court. Neither the statute nor the case relied on by the 
majority dictates that principle, and I dissent from the 
Court's establishing it in this case. 
Section 20 of the Utah Controlled Substances Act of 
1971, codified at § 58-37-19, quoted by the majority, makes 
the provisions of that Act ''controlling" in case of any con-
flicts with tit. 58, ch. 17 (the licensing of pharmacists and 
thP sale of drugs and cedicines) ''or any other laws of this state 
Even if that section would cause the Controlled Sub-
stances Act to prevail over conflicts with the later-enacted 
Criminal Code of 1973, section 20 cannot reasonably be read to 
supersede the effect of a Criminal Code provision that covers 
the same crime treated in the Imitation Controlled Substances Act 
of 1982, §§ 58-37b-l to -8, an entirely different enactment. The 
majority applies the 1971 provision to the 1982 Act on the basis 
that ''the two acts are integrally connected," but it does not 
explain what that means or why it dictates this result. In 
contrast, I suggest that a rule that conduct made felonious by 
the Criminal Code shall no longer be punishable under that Code 
is sufficiently radical that it should only be inferred from a 
clear legislative direction. There is no such direction as to 
the Imitation Controlled Substances Act relied on by the 
majority. 
Helmuth v. hlorris, Utah, 598 P.2d 333 (1979), pro-
vides no support for the reversal of defendant's conviction or 
for the general rule espoused by the majority. That case only 
concerned the lawfulness of the sentence imposed on the 
petitioner for the felony of uttering a forged prescription 
under the Controlled S~bstances Act. Id. at 335. Petitioner 
attacked the legality of that sentence---i:iY habeas corpus, con-
-5- No. 19275 
tending that he was "entitled to the lesser punishnent" pre-
scribed in the Crininal Code for the misdeneanor of forgery. 
Id. The Court rejected that contention because (l) the two 
offenses were "of an entirely different nature" (a ground that 
applies just as well to the theft and distribution offenses 
involved in this case), and (2) the Controlled Substances Act 
"takes precedence" over the Crininal Code in this circunstar1cc, 
because it "applie[d) more specifically'' to petitioner's 
offense. Id. 
Helnuth's holding that the petitioner was not entitli: 
to the lesser sentence under the Criminal Code obviously falls 
far short of dictating that the present defendant's conviction 
under the Crininal Code should be reversed because he night h&vc 
been charged with a lesser offense under the Imitation Con-
trolled Substances Act. Helmuth surely does not establish wh&t 
the majority refers to as "the principle that when an indi-
vidual's conduct can be construed to be a violation of two 
overlapping statutes, the r.iore specific statute governs" (p.2). 
I would affirr.i defendant's conviction for theft by 
deception. 
No. 19275 -6-
'' 
'\ 
APPEND! X 3 
MODEL IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
I\·( 1~ 
'\ I . . . 
\, Drafted by the 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
of the 
United States Department of Justice 
October, 1981 
With 
Prefatory Note and CoITu~ent 
la 
.. . • 
MODEL IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
Prefatory Note 
The wholesale vending of look-alike drugs has become a major, 
nationwide drug abuse problem. Look-alikes are tablets and 
capsules which are manufactured and imprinted to closely 
resemble or even duplicate the appearance of well-known, 
brand name controlled substances, but which contain only non-
controlled over-the-counter drugs such as caffeine, ephedrine, 
phenylpropanolamine, acetaminophen, or some combination of 
these substances. Look-alikes are advertised as being body 
stimulants, alternative energy sources, or nighttime 
analgesics - the "safe," legal way to get high. 
The number of look-alike wholesalers and distributors has 
grown from just a handful at the end of 1979 to more than 
110 in June of 1981. The primary tarqets of this multi-million-
dollar industry are college, high school, and even junior 
high school students. These youthful customers are being 
bombarded by advertising which extols these products as 
being "the most powerful stimulants available without a 
prescription." ~ost of the ads offer jars of 1,000 dosage 
units and suggest that purchasers can make high profits 
from resales. In the past several months, there has been 
a plethora of advertisements in the underground drug press, 
in music magazines, and even in the legitimate press as well 
as a flood of flyers and business cards on college campuses 
and in schoolyards across the country. Some wholesalers 
have expended tens of thousands of dollars on advertising, 
money they consider to be well-spent. 
The recent prol:feration of look-alikes has caused deep 
consternation among law enforcement authorities across the 
nation. Time, effort, and taxpayers' money have been expended 
and arr~~ts have been made only to discover that the so-called 
drugs ~ere actually noncontrolled substances. In some cities, 
so many cases have been dismissed that police departments 
are no longer buying pills or making dangerous drugs cases 
at all. Parents and co1N11unity leaders have written to express 
their feelings of outrage and indignation at the way in which 
these substances are freely advertised and sold. 
Look-alikes are touted as being co~pletely safe and le~al 
and consumers are •avised to take several in or~er to cet 
the full effect. Of course, the danger to a child who-has 
been ingesting five or six caffeine pills and attempts the 
same thing with real amphetamines one day is obvious. Hore 
2a 
insidious is the growing climate of acceptance of these 
substances among students as their sale and use become 
widespread. Of immediate concern, however, are recent 
reports of hospital emergencies and even overdose deaths 
caused solely by ingestion of look-alikes. 
The DEA, for the reasons cited above, considers the manufacture, 
distribution and use of look-alikes to have a substantial and 
detrimental effect on the general welfare of American society, 
particularly on our youth. It is a problem which must be 
dealt with at all levels of Govern~ent. Efforts against the 
look-alike problemi however, must take into consideration 
the facts that the look-alike ingredients have a legitimate 
medical use, they are found in many of the more common 
over-the-counter products and when used as directed, they 
are generally not harmful. DEA has no jurisdicti?n over 
look-alike products under the Controlled Substances Act 
since only noncontrolled substances are involved. However, 
DEA does have a responsibility to combat drug abuse and 
considers the look-alike problem one facet of drug abuse. 
The distribution and sale of look-alikes, much as drug 
paraphernalia, encourages and contributes to the profiteering 
from drug abuse. Thus DEA has undertaken an initiative, 
similar to that used in the paraphernalia problem, against 
look-alikes. At the heart of this initiative is the Model 
Imitation Controlled Substances Act which is targeted to 
eliminate these undesirable enterprises through the application 
of regulations and civil and criminal penalties. A number of 
states have already enacted look-alike legislation. DEA 
applauds this action and encourages other states to do the 
same. The DEA Model Act will serve as a guide for states 
that wish to take legislative action against look-alike 
manufacturers and distributors. 
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MODEL I~ITATION CO\TFOLLED SLlBSTA\C~S ACT 
Section 1. Definitions 
a. The term "controlled substance" means a substar.ce 
as defined in (insert appropriate citation for 
definition of "controlled substance" in State 
Controlled Substances Act). 
b. The term "distribute" means the actual, constructi~. 
or attempted transfer, delivery, or dispensing to 
another of an imitation controlled substance. 
c. The term "manufacture" means the production, 
preparation, compounding, processing, encapsulating, 
packaging, or repackaging, labeling or relabeling, 
of an imitation controlled substance. 
d. The term "imitation controlled substance" means 
a substance that is not a controlled substance, 
which by dosage unit appearance (including color, 
shape, size and markings), or by representations 
made~ would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that the substance is a controlled substance. 
In those rare cases when the appearance of the 
dosage unit is not reasonably sufficient to 
establish that the substance is an "imitation 
controlled substance" (for exarn?le in the case 
of powder or liquid), the court or authority 
cqncerned should consider, in addition to all 
other logically relevant factors, the following 
factors as related to "representations made" in 
determining whether the substance is an "imitation 
controlled substance": 
4a 
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(1) Statements made by an owner or by 
anyone else in control of the substance 
concerning the nature of the substance, 
or its use or effect. 
(2) Statements made to the recipient that 
the substance may be resold for 
inordinate profit. 
( 3) Whether the substance is packaged 
in a manner normally used for illicit 
controlled substances. 
(4) Evasive tactics or actions utilized 
by the owner or person in control of 
the substance to avoid detection by law 
enforcement authorities. 
(5) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, 
or anyone in control of the object, under 
state or Federal law related to controlled 
substances or fraud. 
(6) The proximity of the substances to 
controlled substances. 
Section 2. Offenses 
a. ~a~u~acture or distri~utio~ - It is unlaw~ul for 
any person to manufacture, distribute, or possess 
with intent to distribute, an imitation controlled 
substance. Any person who violates this section 
shall be guilty of a crime and upon conviction 
may be imprisoned for not more than 
fined not more than ~~~~~~' or both. 
Sa 
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b. Distribution to a minor - Any person 18 years 
of age or over who violates Section 2a by 
distributing an imitation controlled substance to 
a person under 18 years of a9e is guilty of an 
aggravated crime and upon conviction may be 
imprisoned for not more than 
more than -------' or both. 
c. Possession - It is unlawful for any person to use, 
or to possess with intent to use, an i_rnitation 
controlled substance. Ariy person who violates 
this section is guilty of a crime and upon 
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than 
--------' fined not more than 
or both. 
d. Advertisement - It is unlawful for any person to 
place any newspaper, magazine, handbill or ~ther 
pubfication, or to post or distribute in any 
public place, any advertisement or solicitation 
with reasonable knowledge that the purpose of 
the advertisement or solicitation is to promote 
the distribution of imitation controlled substances. 
Any person who violates this section is guilty of 
a crime' and upon conviction may be imprisoned for 
not more than , fined not more tha~ 
-------------' or both. 
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e. I~~unity - No civil or criminal liability shall be 
imposed by virtue of this Act on any person registered 
under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, 
distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled 
substance for use as a placebo by a registered 
practitioner in the course of professional practice 
or research. 
section 3. Forfeiture 
(Insert designation of state civil forfeiture section) 
is amended to provide for the civil forfeiture of 
imitation controlled substances by adding the following 
after paragraph (insert designation of last category 
of forfeitable property): 
" ( all imitation controlled substances 
as defined by (list appropriate citation for 
this Act in the state's statutes). 
Section 4. Severability 
If any provision of this Act or the application of 
the Act to any person or circumstance is held invalid, 
the invalidity does not affect the other provisions or 
applications ~f the Act which can be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application and to this end the 
provisions of this Act are severable. 
7a 
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CO!·L'!ENT 
The Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act incorporates t; 
reference certain definitions in the applicable State Con-
trolled Substances Act, but does not atte~pt to incorporate 
or amend the definition of "counterfeit substance'' in the 
State Controlled Substances Act. DEA believes it would 
unnecessarily confuse the issues to attempt to a~end the 
definition of "counterfeit substance" in the State Controlled 
Substances Act. Therefore, the Model Act uses a new term 
of "imi ta ti on control led substance" as the key to the ~lode 1 
Act. 
DEA believes that many of the existing and draft State Acts 
which have sought to reach the look-alike problem have 
placed too much emphasis on the representations made by the 
seller of the substances. Hence, the DEA Model Act seeks 
to place emphasis on the "look-alike" nature of most of the 
substances involved to sustain the burden of proving a 
violation. The portion of the DEA Model Act which deals 
with "representations made" by the seller is not really 
intended to reach look-alikes in tablet or caosule form, 
but rather, is intended to reach those cases where powder 
or liquid is represented to be controlled sub~tances. Most 
cases related to powder will involve alleged cocaine or 
heroin and most cases related to liquid will involve alleged 
PCP or other hallucinogenic drugs. 
The sections of the Model Act which deal with penalties, 
advertisement, forfeiture, and severability are framed from 
the pattern used in the !lodel Drug Paraphernalia Act, drafted 
by DEA in August 1979. As of October 1981, the Model Para-
phernalia Act has been enacted by 23 states and many localities, 
and has been upheld at the state level by every Federal 
District Court and Appeals Court that has considered it. As 
in the Model Paraphernalia Act, the 11odel Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act leaves to each state the specific penalty to 
be inserted as a sanction for each of the criminal offenses 
proscribed by the Act. 
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MODEL HlITATION C01'Tl'OLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
Prefatory !Jote 
The wholesale vending of look-alike drugs has become a major, 
nationwide drug abuse problem. Look-alikes are tablets and 
capsules which are manufactured and imprinted to closely 
resemble or even duplicate the appearance of well-known, 
~rand nanc controlled substances,-but which contain only non-
ccntrolled over-the-counter drugs such as caffeine, eohedrine, 
1 henylpro?anolamine, acetaminophen, or some combinati~n of 
these substances. Look-alikes are advertised as being body 
stinulants, alternative energy sources, or nighttime 
analgesics - the "safe," legal way to get hi']h. 
The number of look-alike wholesalers and distributors has 
Grown from JUSt a handful at the end of 1979 to more than 
ilO in June of 1981. The primary targets of this multi-million-
dollar industry are college, high school, and even Junior 
high school students. These youthful customers are being 
bombarded by advertising which extols these products as 
be1n9 "the most 001,·erful stir.ula:-its a·:ailable without a 
prescription." ~lost of the ads offer jars of 1,000 dosage 
units and suggest that purchasers can make high profits 
from resales. In the past several months, there has been 
a plethora of advertisements in the u:-iderground drug press, 
in music magazines, and even in the legitimate press as well 
as a flood of flyers and business cards on college campuses 
and in schoolyards across the country. Some wholesalers 
have expended tens of thousands of dollars on advertising, 
money they consider to be well-spent. 
The recent orol:feration of look-alikes has caused deep 
consternati~n among law enforcement authorities across the 
nation. Time, effort, and taxpayers' money have been expended 
and arr0sts have been made only to discover that the so-called 
dru~s wer~ actually noncontrolled substances. In some cities, 
so many cases have been dismissed that police departments 
are no longer buying pills or making dangerous drugs cases 
at all. Parents and community leaders have written to express 
their feelings of outrage and indignation at the way in which 
these substances are freely advertised and sold. 
Look-alikes are touted as being cor~letely safe and legal 
and consumers are ~dvised to take several in order to get 
the full effect. Of course, the danger to a child who has 
been ingesting five or six caffeine pills and attempts the 
same thing with real amphetamines one day is obvious. More 
insidious is the growing climate of acceptance of these 
suLstances among students as their sale and use become 
;1idesr·reud. Of im.'Tlediate concern, however, are recent 
rerorts of hospital emergencies and even overdose deaths 
caused solely by ingestion of look-alikes. 
The Der,, for the reasons cited above, considers the manufacture, 
distribution and use of look-alikes to have a substantial and 
detrin1c·ntal effect on the general v.·elfare of American society, 
rarticularly on our youth. It is a problem which must be 
rlealt with at all levels of Government. Efforts against the 
look-alike oroble~, however, must take into consideration 
the facts that the look-alike ingredients have a legitimate 
c'it0 dical use, they are found in many o~ the more corrunon 
over-the-counter products and when used as directed, they 
are generally not harmful. DEA has no JUrisdicti9n over 
look-alike products under the Controlled Substances Act 
since only noncontrolled substances are involved. However, 
DEA does have a responsibility to combat drug abuse and 
considers the look-alike problem one facet of drug abuse. 
The distribution and sale of look-alikes, much as drug 
~araphernalia, encourages and contributes to the profiteering 
from drug abuse. Thus DEA has undertaken an initiative, 
similar to that used in the paraphernalia problem, against 
look-alikes. At the heart of this initiative is the Model 
I~itation Controlled Substances ~ct which is targeted to 
eliminate these undesirable enterprises through the application 
of reculations and civil and cri~inal oenalties. A number of 
state~ have already enacted look-alike-legislation. DEA 
arplauds this action and encourages other states to do the 
same. The DEA Model Act will serve as a guide for states 
that wish to take legislative action against look-alike 
manufacturers and distributors. 
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MODEL Il:ITATIOH CO\TFOLLED SUBSTANCES AC'!' 
Section 1. Definitions 
a. The term "controlled substance" means a substance 
as defined in (insert appropriate citation for 
definition of "controlled substance" in State 
Controlled Substances Act). 
b. The term "distribute" means the actual, constructive, 
or attempted transfer, delivery, or dispensing to 
another of an imitation controlled substance. 
c. The term "manufacture" means the production, 
preparation, compounding, processing, encapsulating, 
packaging, or repackaging, labeling or relabeling, 
of an imitation controlled substance. 
d. The term "imitation controlled substance" means 
a substance that is not a controlled substance, 
which by dosage unit appearance (including color, 
shape, size and markings), or by representations 
made~ would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that the substance is a controlled substance. 
In those rare cases when the appearance of the 
dosage unit is not reasonably sufficient to 
establish that the substance is an "imitation 
controlled substance" (for example in the case 
of powd~r or liquid~ the court or authority 
cqncerned should consider, in addition to all 
other logically relevant factors, the fo~lowing 
factors as related to "representations made" in 
determining whether the substance is an "imitation 
controlled substance": 
Section 2. 
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(1) Statements made by an owner or by 
anyone else in control of the substance 
concerning the nature of the substance, 
or its use or effect. 
(2) Statements made to the recipient that 
the substance may be resold for 
inordinate profit. 
(3) Whether the substance is packaged 
in a manner normally used for illicit 
controlled substances. 
(4) Evasive tactics or actions utilized 
by the owner or person in control of 
the substance to avoid detection by law 
enforcement authorities. 
(5) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, 
or anyone in control of the object, under 
state or Federal law related to controlled 
substances or fraud. 
(6) The proximity of the substances to 
controlled substances. 
Offenses 
a. ~:a~~~act~=e o= dis~=i~u~io~ - It is u~la~~ul fo= 
any person to manufacture, distribute, or possess 
with intent to distribute, an imitation controlled 
substance. Any person who violates this ~ection 
shall be guilty of a crime and upon conviction 
may be imprisoned for not more than 
fined not more than ~~~~~~' or both. 
---
b. 
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Distribution to a minor - Any person 18 years 
of age or over who violates Section 2a by 
distributing an imitation controlled substance to 
a person under 18 years of age is guilty of an 
aggravated crime and upon conviction may be 
imprisoned for not more than -------' fined not 
more than _______ , or both. 
c. Possession - It is unlawful for any person to use, 
or to possess with intent to use, an lJllitation 
controlled substance. Any person who violates 
this section is guilty of a crime and upon 
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than 
--------' fined not more than 
or both. 
d. Advertisement - It is unlawful for any person to 
place any newspaper, magazine, handbill or other 
pubfication, or to post or distribute in any 
public place, any advertisement or solicitation 
with reasonable knowledge that the purpose of 
the advertisement or solicitation is to promote 
the distribution of imitation controlled substances. 
Any person who violates this section is guilty of 
a crime' and upon conviction may be imprisoned for 
not more than , fined not more than 
, or both. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
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e. Im~unity - No civil or criminal liability shall be 
imposed by virtue of this Act on any person registered 
under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, 
distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled 
substance for use as a placebo by a registered 
practitioner in the course of professional practice 
or research. 
Section 3. Forfeiture 
(Insert designation of state civil forfeiture section) 
is amended to provide for the civil forfeiture of 
imitation controlled substances by adding the following 
after paragraph (insert designation of last category 
of forfeitable property): 
" ( all imitation controlled substances 
as defined by (list appropriate citation for 
this Act in the state's statutes). 
Section 4. Severability 
If any provision of this Act or the application of 
the Act to any person or circumstance is held invalid, 
the invalidity does not affect the other provisions or 
applications ~£ the Act which can be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application and to this end the 
provisi~ns of this Act are severable. 
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CO!l:,lENT 
The Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act incorporates by 
reference certain definitions in the applicable State Con-
trolled Substances Act, but does not attempt to incorporate 
or amend the definition of "counterfeit substance" in the 
State Controlled Substances Act. DEA believes it would 
unnecessarily confuse the issues to attempt to amend the 
definition of "counterfeit substance" in the State Controlled 
Substances Act. Therefore, the Model Act uses a new term 
of "imitation controlled substance" as the key to the ~lodel 
Act. 
DEA believes that many of the existing and draft State Acts 
which have sought to reach the look-alike problem have 
placed too much emphasis on the representations made by the 
seller of the substances. Hence, the DEA Model Act seeks 
to place emphasis on the "look-alike" nature of most of the 
substances involved to sustain the burden of proving a 
violation. The portion of the DEA Model Act which deals 
with "representations made" by the seller is not really 
intended to reach look-alikes in tablet or caosule form, 
but rather, is intended to reach those cases where powder 
or 11guid is represented to be controlled sub~tances. Most 
cases related to powder will involve alleged cocaine or 
heroin and most cases related to liquid will involve alleged 
PCP or other hallucinogenic drugs. 
The sections of the Model Act which deal with penalties, 
advertisement, forfeiture, and severability are framed from 
the pattern used in the tlodel Drug Paraphernalia Act, drafted 
by DEA in August 1979. As of October 1981, the Model Para-
phernalia Act has been enacted by 23 states and many localities, 
and has been upheld at the state level by every Federal 
District Court and Appeals Court that has considered it. As 
in the l\odel Paraphernalia Act, the tlodel Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act leaves to each state the specific penalty to 
be inserted as a sanction for each of the criminal offenses 
proscribed by the Act. 
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